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ABSTRACT
The construction of nuclear power plants is a major step towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions
compared to the conventional coal-fired or oil-fired power plants. However, some of the major nuclear
accidents in the past have raised questions about the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. This paper
compares and contrasts the major nuclear accidents of the past for example, the Chernobyl disaster (USSR),
the Fukushima Daiichi disaster (Japan), and the Three Mile Island incident (USA). Although each of the
accidents was unique, a thorough comparison found some common issues, such as faulty design of reactors
and safety systems, safety rules violations, and lack of trained operators.
The primary impacts mostly involved radiation hazards such as exposure to varying doses of radiation,
uninhabitable neighborhoods and health problems; the levels of impact varied mostly due to different
intensities of warnings and precautionary measures taken by the local governments. The research findings
would serve as an important resource for the nuclear professionals to plan proper precautionary measures in
order to avoid the major issues that initiated or resulted from the accidents in the past.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power plants are one of the most complex
and sophisticated energy systems designed to
produce low carbon electrical energy in contrast to
the conventional (e.g., lignite-, coal-, and oilbased) power plants. Table 1 provides a
comparative summary of the amount of
greenhouse gas emitted in the lifecycle of the
nuclear plants and the other conventional plants as
published by the World Nuclear Association (WNA
[World Nuclear Association, 2011]). A World Health
Organization (WHO) study has estimated that
greenhouse gases generated from conventional
power plants since 1990 caused an extra 150,000
deaths in 2000, which are mostly attributable to the
global warming–related climate change combined
with
malnutrition,
diarrhea,
cardiovascular
diseases, and premature deaths due to air
pollution (Markandya & Wilkinson, 2007).
However, the recent nuclear accident in
Fukushima Daiichi, Japan, in 2011 was a wakeup
call to the entire nuclear industry, and questions
were raised about the social benefits and costs
associated with nuclear power (Aoki & Rothwell,
2013).
This research evaluated the five major nuclear power
plant accidents as case studies and compared and

contrasted the major causes and related
consequences behind those accidents. This paper

summarizes the important lessons learned from
the past instances which could serve as an
information tool for the nuclear professionals to
plan for proper preventive measures well in
advance to avoid similar accidents in future.
2. RANKING SYSTEM
Nuclear accidents are ranked based on severity
using a logarithmic scale called the International
Table 1. Intensity of lifecycle greenhouse gas emission by the
different energy facilities Source: World Nuclear Association
[WNA], 2011
Generation facilities
(Technologies)

Mean

Low

High

Tonnes CO2e/Giga-Watt-Hour
Lignite

1054

790

1372

Coal

888

756

1310

Oil

733

547

935

Natural gas

499

362

891

Solar PV

85

13

731

Biomass

45

10

101

Nuclear

29

2

130

Hydroelectric

26

2

237

Wind

26

6

124
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Figure 1. International nuclear and radiological event scale.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2013

Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)
developed by the International Atomic Agency in
1990. The scale ranges from 1 to 7, where 1
represents least severe and 7 represents most
severe. The ranking is interpreted as follows: “a
nuclear event rated 4 in the scale is ten times worse
than that rated at 3” (IAEA, 2013). Figure 1 is a
pictorial representation of the INES Scale.
3. MAJOR ACCIDENT BACKGROUNDS
A nuclear power plant is a highly complex system,
and any type of minor malfunction of a single
component, operator error, or even a minor design
fault, can cause a catastrophic disaster which may
not only have short-term effects but also severe
long-term effects due to harmful nuclear radiation.
Each of the nuclear accidents was unique and,
thus, needs to be analyzed independently to reveal
the major causes behind their occurrence. The
related consequences and the mitigation strategies
that were adopted in each case based on the
scenario details are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
3.1. Chernobyl, USSR, 1986; INES Rank 7
The Chernobyl disaster that occurred in the city of
Pripyat, in the USSR on April 25, 1986, is ranked as
the most severe accident by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as it involved not
only heat transients but also reactivity transients,
that is, it released radioactive elements (fission
products) in the biosphere in major proportions. It
not only killed onsite personnel but also the
contamination traveled far and wide to affect the
surrounding environment and caused immense
health impacts for the people living in the region.
The accident, which is referred to as one of the

worst disasters in the history of the nuclear industry,
resulted from a series of design weaknesses in the
reactor that turned into a deadly disaster due to a
series of operator errors and safety violations during
a botched experiment. The accident occurred while
performing a risky experiment of testing if the
residual energy from the torque of a turbine could
run a turbine generator while the turbines were
coasting down in the event of a loss of electric
power (a station “blackout”). It was necessary to
keep the cooling pumps working in the brief gap
(about 100 seconds) of the power outage and the
running of the generators. The experiment was
performed by turning off many safety signals and
safety valves. Huge amounts of radioactivity in the
6
order of 7x10 curies was released, killing 31 onsite
operators (Malinauskas, 1987) followed by the
death of 7,000–10,000 liquidators who helped in
cleaning the site (Dickman, 1991); contaminating
air, soil, vegetation and cattle; causing thyroid
cancer in children; and impacting the general health
of the inhabitants settled in the surrounding areas
(30 kilometers in radius [Peplow, 2011; Norman,
1986; Rich, 1989; Balter, 1996; Kazakov,
Demidchik, Astakhova, &Baverstock, 1992]).
3.2. Fukushima Daiichi, Japan, 2011; INES Rank 7
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
disaster is considered the worst disaster after
Chernobyl in the history of nuclear power plants.
This event took place after the Great East Japan
Earthquake (magnitude 9.0 on the Richter Scale),
which occurred off the Sanriku coast of Japan on
March 11, 2011 (Robertson & Pengilley, 2012). The
earthquake generated a series of tsunamis along
the coast of Japan, which negatively affected
several nuclear plants situated in the coastal area.
However, Fukushima Daiichi was the worst, and its
subsequent problems resulted in a state of nuclear
emergency in Japan. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant is one of the 15 largest power plants in
the world. It consisted of six boiling water reactors
(BWRs) designed by General Electric (GE) and
maintained by the Tokyo Electric Power Company
(TEPCO) and generated a combined power of 4.7
gigawatts (Dauer, Zanzonico, Tuttle, Quinn, &
Strauss, 2011). The accident was caused due to a
series of equipment failures, violation of safety
regulations, and faulty design of the plant layout
along with underestimation of the “design-basis
tsunami height” parameter used in design
considerations of the plant. The Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear plant was designed initially based on the
assumption that the maximum estimated height of a
tsunami could be 3.1 meters above the mean sea
level although TEPCO used a revised design basis
tsunami height of 5.7 meters. However, in 2011, the
estimated height of the tsunami waves was 15
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meters, on average, just before it caused the
landfall (Acton & Hibbs, 2012). All these factors led
to consecutive nuclear meltdowns resulting in the
release of radioactivity into the environment. The
accident was ranked 7 by the INES, on a scale of 1
to 7, and is considered to be the second worst
nuclear accident in the history of nuclear power
plants since 1952 (IAEA, 2013). Radioactive plumes
spread erratically due to the wind, contaminating
the sea water and soil (Yamaguchi, 2011; Mathieu,
et al., 2012; Testing the waters for radionuclides
(Nuclear Energy, n.d.), affecting the livestock
industry (Tsuiki & Maeda, 2012), and infecting the
human and cattle in the surrounding regions
causing rapid depopulation and community
breakups (Ishikawa, Kanazawa, Morimoto, &
Takahashi, 2012).
3.3. Chalk River Incident, Canada, 1952; INES
Rank 5
The Chalk River Laboratories located on the bank
of the Chalk River, Ontario, Canada, is a huge
facility that was developed by a joint collaboration
between Canada, the United States, and Great
Britain. Besides conducting several atomic bomb
projects during World War II, Canada’s National
Research Council (NRC) felt the need to expand
commercial power production from nuclear energy
and started to operate an experimental reactor
called NRX beginning in 1947 (The NRX Incident).
On December 12, 1952, an accident occurred due
to
human
flaws,
operating
errors,
and
miscommunication among the supervisor and
operating personnel. Due to the accident, the NRX
nuclear reactor was completely destroyed, and a
series of steam and hydrogen gas explosions
spewed thousands of fission particles into the air
(Chalk River Nuclear Accident, n.d.). Although,
this accident did not cause any injury to workers
or widespread environmental contamination, it
completely destroyed the nuclear reactor core.
The reactor core could not be decontaminated
and had to be buried as nuclear waste (Chalk
River Nuclear Accident, n.d.). It was ranked 5 by
the INES in terms of its severity. It was followed
by a second accident 6 year later in 1958 when
the overheated uranium metal fuel rods broke
inside the reactor core (Chalk River Nuclear
Accident, n.d.). The accident was managed
efficiently
and
the
impact
of
radiation
contamination was minimized (Cross, 1980; Chalk
River nuclear accident, n.d.).

Although it involved release of small amounts of
radioactive gases, it destroyed the reactor as it
had undergone partial meltdown due to a loss-ofcoolant –accident (LOCA). The accident that
occurred in the TMI nuclear power plant was a
combined effect of a series of mechanical failures,
lack of proper training of the operators, human
errors, and misunderstanding of the system by the
operators (human computer interface). In addition,
design flaws related to indicators and warning
systems resulted in minor mechanical failures in
the secondary cooling system of the reactor,
which lead to a more severe nuclear incident
(Mynatt, 1982; WNA, 2001). A total release of
radioactivity in the range of 2.4 million to 13
million curies was recorded, although much less
(around 13 to 17 curies) was released into the
environment (Mynatt, 1982). Thus, the health
impact of the accident on the public was mostly
psychological rather than a result of exposure to
radiation. (Lavelle, 1999; Pool, 1991; Hatch,
Wallenstein, Beyea, Nieves, & Susser, 1991;
Goldhaber, Staub, & Tokuhata, 1983).
3.5. SL-1 (Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number
1), US, 1961; INES Rank 4
The Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number One
(SL-1) was an experimental power reactor located
40 miles west of Idaho Falls, Idaho, and was
operated by the U.S. Army. Its main purpose was
to provide electrical power to remote military
facilities in the area (U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission, 1961). On January 3, 1961, during
routine maintenance, the central control rod was
removed too far causing the reactor to suffer a
prompt criticality1 accident, resulting in a steam
explosion and deaths of all the three operators on
site. The INES rating of 4 was determined based
on the fact that soil and air samples indicated
traces of contamination. However, the reactor
building was highly effective at enclosing the
radioactive materials dispersed from the steam
explosion (Horan & Gammill, 1963). Except for the
three fatalities, there was not much health and
environmental impact as around 99.99% of the
total fission products from the reactor were
retained inside the reactor building (Adams,
1996).
Table 2 provides a comparative analysis of the
major causes and issues, identified through the
extensive literature review across the five major
accidents.

3.4. TMI (Three Mile Island), US, 1979; INES
Rank 5
The Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear accident,
March 28, 1979, was the worst nuclear accident in
the United States commercial nuclear industry.

1

An assembly is referred to as prompt critical if for each nuclear
fission event, one or more of the immediate or prompt neutrons
released causes an additional fission event which causes a rapid
exponential increase in the number of fission events
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Table 2. Comparative analysis of the major issues
Issues

Chernobyl

Faulty Design

x

FDNPP

Chalkriver

TMI

x

x

Inadequate
Safety & Warning
Systems

x

x

Lack of Trained
Professionals

x

Operators’ error

x

x

4.2. Training

x

Equipment
Failure

Violation of
Safety
Regulations

SL-1

x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x

4. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE
STUDIES
A thorough literature review of the past nuclear
power plant accidents revealed a series of issues
that need to be addressed so that the probability of
future accidents is significantly lowered. This paper
categorizes the lessons learned from three
perspectives:
•

Safety

•

Training

•

Response and mitigation strategies

were closed for maintenance for 2 weeks before the
accident

4.1. Safety
Sophisticated and more accurate weather
forecasting warning systems are necessary in order
to get prepared for the upcoming disaster. After the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster,
the Japan government proposed to install a system
of ocean-bottom sensors costing around US $402
million so that it can provide more accurate
warnings of tsunamis heading towards the coast
(Malinauskas, 1987).
Whether a nuclear power plant is in an operating
state or undergoing a shutdown phase, safety
regulations proposed by the respective nuclear
regulatory commission to which the plants are
affiliated should be strictly followed (WNA, 2013).
For example, one of the major reasons behind the
TMI accident was the violation of the safety
regulations as proposed by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). According to NRC
regulations, if the auxiliary feed water pumps are
out of service for 72 hours or more, the nuclear
power plant's reactor must be shut down. However,
the operators of the TMI nuclear power plant did not
shut down the reactor core even when the valves
on the reactor's auxiliary feed water pump system

Proper training of the all the operating personnel
working in a nuclear plant is necessary because a
small mistake due to ignorance on part of the
operators, in terms of lack of knowledge or violation
of safety regulations, can sometimes lead to a
major accident. A comparative analysis of the major
causes (Table 2) revealed that operator’s error is
the most common cause behind each of the
accidents. For example, in the case of the Chalk
River incident, due to a lack of profound knowledge
about the nuclear reactor operating switches, the
operator blindly followed the supervisor’s wrong
instructions (Chalk River Nuclear Accident, n.d.).
The SL-1 accident was initiated when the operator
manually removed the control rod by 50 centimeters
instead of 10 centimeters which was required to
reconnect the central control rod to the drive
mechanism after 11 days of a routine shutdown.
This might have also happened due to the
ignorance of the operator or his lack of knowledge
about the fact that even a lift of 40 centimeters of
the control rods would be enough to make the
reactor critical (Adams, 1996).
Health physicians working in the hospitals that are
included in the emergency plans of the nuclear
power plants should be specially trained to manage
these emergency situations in case of an accident
and offer immediate care to the people exposed to
radiation hazards.
4.3. Response and Mitigation Strategies
Efficient response and mitigation strategies require
good communication between the public and the
government after a nuclear disaster, presence of
adequate contingency plans with respect to efficient
transportation from the affected site to the hospitals,
and the availability of health counseling to reduce
the psychological impact of the radiation hazards on
the public. Moreover government and nuclear
agencies should work collaboratively to develop an
efficient debris-removal strategy; in most of the
cases, after the nuclear accidents, the affected sites
are exposed to high doses of radiation exposure
that adversely affect the health of the liquidators
responsible for cleaning the affected site.
4.3.1. Efficient Communication and Coordination
After a nuclear disaster, the government should
clearly communicate the severity of the disaster and
the related health impacts for both in the cases of
high radiation and low radiation exposure (Nature,
2011; Peplow, 2011). This was done very efficiently
in the case of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear accident
but not at all in the case of Chernobyl accident,
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when children were even allowed play outside after
the accident happened (Peplow, 2011).
An efficient area-wide telecommunication system
surrounding a nuclear power plant is important to
keep the power plant, hospitals, and other local
emergency management agencies in a wellintegrated network (Maxwell, 1982).
A postmortem analysis of the TMI nuclear accident
suggested that the evacuation planning and
disaster response strategies should account for the
medical
emergencies,
and,
thus,
efficient
communication between nuclear engineers and
health physicians should be fostered (Maxwell,
1982). A lack of such mitigation strategies led to
severe disorganization and mismanagement in the
neighboring health care agencies of the TMI nuclear
power plant.
4.3.2. Requirements for Efficient Response and
Recovery Processes
Adequate contingency plans should be prepared by
the hospitals in regards to hospital staffing, as well
as transfer of bed-ridden patients from the affected
area to another hospital in a safer area in case of
an emergency situation. Lack of such plans led to
several organizational problems in the neighboring
hospitals and health care institutions surrounding
the TMI nuclear power plant after the accident
(Maxwell, 1982).
The after-accident crises in the TMI incident also
suggested that transportation facilities should be
readily available to the hospitals and the other
health care facilities so that, in case of an
emergency, immediate evacuation is possible
(Maxwell, 1982).
The sale of milk and food products should be strictly
prohibited in the contaminated areas to prevent the
spread of radioactivity as the radioactive elements
iodine-131 and cesium-137 are highly absorbed by
milk and vegetables, respectively. In the Chernobyl
disaster, the government did not take any action
regarding restricting sales, but after the Fukushima
Daiichi disaster, the Japanese government (likely
taking a lesson from Chernobyl) strictly stopped the
sale of milk and food products in the surrounding
regions of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant
(Fukuda, et al., 2013; Tsuiki & Maeda, 2012).
Funding is essential for the recovery process.
However, it is extremely hard to maintain the flow of
funds after nuclear disasters occur because of
inadequate public relations information (Nature,
2011).
Efficient rescue planning needs to be done in
regards to sending the rescue team to the radiationaffected area. This was a lesson learned from the

Chalk River and the SL-1 accidents which are
looked upon as great examples where well-planned
and efficient response strategies were adopted such
that radiation contamination did not have severe
after effects.
4.3.3. Efficient Health Recovery of Public
Health counseling offered through several
workshops, campaigns, and seminars to the public
sometimes help in reducing the huge psychological
impact and posttraumatic stress on the people.
(Peplow, 2011; Kamada, Saito, Endo, Kimura, &
Shizuma, 2012; BBC, 2011). For example, after the
TMI nuclear accident, a TMI Public Health and
Information Series on cancer, radiation, and
epidemiology was conducted in the nearby
universities to provide more information on the
health effects due to a nuclear disaster so that the
people could educate themselves about the
radiation consequences and relieve themselves
from the existing stress and trauma of the disaster.
Special attention should be given to small children
and pregnant mothers as they are more likely to be
affected by the radioactive iodine-131, as this
element is easily absorbed by the thyroid glands of
children and can later in life possibly cause thyroid
cancer. The USSR government failed to take such
precautions after the Chernobyl disaster which
resulted in an increased number of thyroid cancer
patients, most of whom were children (Balter, 1996;
Kazakov et al., 1992).
Systematic distribution of prophylactic potassium
iodide (a thyroid blocking agent) to the public and
also the nearby health care agencies is essential
(Balter, 1996; Maxwell, 1982).
4.3.4. Efficient Evacuation Planning
Immediate
evacuation
orders
should
be
implemented by the government so that, even if
there is a spread of radioactivity in the surrounding
areas of the nuclear plant, the inhabitants do not
have to encounter a prolonged exposure to
radioactivity. The Japanese government did the
evacuation planning very efficiently after the nuclear
disaster, whereas in the case of Chernobyl disaster,
evacuation orders were given 10 days after the
accident to the people in the surrounding areas
(areas beyond 3 kilometers in radius from the
nuclear plant) (Peplow, 2011; Malinauskas, 1987;
BBC, 2011; Yamaguchi, 2011).
5. CONCLUSION
This research study considered five major nuclear
power plant accidents based on the severity ranking
by INES as case studies and analyzes the causes
and issues behind those accidents, the
consequences of the accidents, and the related
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mitigation strategies adopted in each case to
provide a concrete background for the lessons
learned from the history. This paper provides a brief
overview of each of the accidents and a
comparative analysis of the causes across the five
incidents. The outcome of this research is a series
of lessons learned from the past instances that
could serve as an important information tool for
nuclear professionals to plan adequate safety and
response strategies which would reduce the
probability of a disaster taking place and reduce the
impact of a disaster in case it occurs.
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